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I. INTRODUCING POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE
Polygraph tests rely on the hypothesis that a subject's body
yields physiologically different symptoms if he or she is lying.' When
a polygraph test is administered, a mechanical apparatus records the
subject's physiological changes, and the polygrapher conducting the
examination interprets the data.2 The techniques for measuring
physiological changes vary in their foci, which may include
respiration, blood pressure, cardiovascular function, and skin
resistance.3 The polygraph apparatus4 records changes to one or more
of these foci, and a technician, or polygrapher, then analyzes the
results to conclude whether the subject has been truthful.
Polygraph results factor into choices ranging from indictment
determinations to employment decisions. Between 1981 and 1997, the
Pentagon conducted more than 400,000 polygraph examinations. 5
Similarly, state law enforcement officers have conducted thousands of
polygraph examinations. 6 Even in the private sector, where federal
law significantly limits private employers from requesting polygraph
examinations, employee test results may lead to criminal liability.7
While other segments of society use polygraph results, courts
remain reluctant to admit them. Although only two federal circuits
employ common law bans against polygraph evidence,8 district courts
in every circuit consistently reject polygraph evidence. 9 Similarly,
many state courts have excluded polygraph evidence for all purposes.' 0
Unfortunately, many of these courts can only exclude polygraph
1. COMM. TO REVIEW THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ON THE POLYGRAPH, NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADS., THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION 11 (2003).
2. Id. at 14.
3. 42 AM. JUR. Trials § 313, 331-40 (1991).
4. "Apparatus" will be omitted from future references to the equipment used for polygraph
testing.
5. David G. Savage, Let Trial Judges Decide: High Court Rejects a Per Se Rule on
Polygraph Evidence, 84 A.B.A. J., June 1998, at 52, 52; see 29 U.S.C. § 2006 (2006) (exempting
government employees and certain government contractors from federal protections against
polygraph examinations in the employment context).
6. See, e.g., Height v. State, 604 S.E.2d 796, 797 (Ga. 2004) (discussing a retired Georgia
Bureau of Investigation officer's statement that she had conducted nearly 3,000 polygraph
examinations in her career). Georgia courts do not admit polygraph evidence at trial unless both
parties stipulate otherwise. Id. at 797-98.
7. See 29 U.S.C. § 2006(d)-(f) (2006) (allowing polygraph tests for private employees in
certain circumstances); id. § 2008(c) (providing for disclosure of criminal actions).
8. Lee v. Martinez, 96 P.3d 291, 311 (N.M. 2004).
9. Id. at 312 (quoting State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 776-77 (Conn. 1997)).
10. See Lee, 96 P.3d at 310 (providing a list of state cases as of summer 2004 that identifies
twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia as barring polygraph evidence for all purposes).
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evidence by warping generic evidentiary rules to act as per se bans.11
This Note focuses on their misapplication of evidentiary rules.
Many criticisms of polygraph evidence have merit, but these
concerns should not lead courts to warp evidentiary rules in order to
exclude polygraph evidence. For instance, competing studies find
various polygraph methods accurate in anywhere from 12.5 to 90
percent of tests,12 but courts should not transpose poor accuracy tests
for one testing method to conclude that all other methods are
unreliable. 13 Similarly, courts may have legitimate public policy
concerns that polygraphy could usurp the jury's role as fact-finder, 14
but because statutory rules potentially allow polygraph evidence, only
legislatively enacted per se bans should properly exclude all polygraph
evidence.
Part II of this Note examines how judicial decisions have
structured today's case law on the admissibility of polygraph evidence.
In Part III, this Note will discuss how courts apply the five prevailing
bars to polygraph admissibility: Rules 702, 403, 608, and 704, and per
se bans. 15 Part IV argues that although each of these bars can
properly exclude polygraph evidence in many circumstances, courts
11. See discussion infra Part III.
12. Compare Paul C. Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence: Post-Daubert, 49 HASTINGs L.J. 895,
896 (1998) (citing United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 1995), which found an
accuracy rate of 70 to 90 percent), with Timothy B. Henseler, Comment, A Critical Look at the
Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in the Wake of Daubert: The Lie Detector Fails the Test, 46
CATH. U. L. REV. 1247, 1280 n.231 (1997) (referencing studies by the Office of Technology
Assessment, one of which found such a low accuracy rate (12.5 percent) that, to this author, the
result appears to be a statistical outlier); see also infra text accompanying note 155 (discussing
studies that find polygraph testing to be reliable 50 percent of the time).
13. See discussion of Rule 702 infra Part III.C.
14. Perhaps the most colorful argument against polygraph evidence appears in a 1975
decision: "When polygraph evidence is offered in evidence at trial, it is likely to be shrouded with
an aura of near infallibility, akin to the ancient oracle of Delphi." United States v. Alexander,
526 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir. 1975). The drafters of Military Rule of Evidence 707, which is
discussed further in Part II, cited this language as a basis for excluding polygraph evidence.
United States v. Scheffer, 41 M.J. 683, 686 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995) [hereinafter Scheffer 1].
Under such an argument, courts should exclude polygraph evidence because a jury might give
the results disproportionate weight. Justice Clarence Thomas articulated this sentiment further
in parts II.B and IIC of his Scheffer opinion, which gained the support of three other Justices.
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 312-15 (1998) [hereinafter Scheffer IV. Essentially,
Justice Thomas argued that the jury's historical role as fact-finder would be supplanted by
polygraph evidence and that considering such evidence would lead to regular litigation over
issues other than determining the defendant's guilt. Id.
15. This Note will generally refer to evidentiary rules within the numbering system
employed by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Hence, "Federal Rule of Evidence 401" will normally
appear in the text as "Rule 401." Since the 1975 adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, forty-
two states and Puerto Rico have adopted their principles in whole or great part. GEORGE
FISHER, EVIDENCE 3 (2002). Accordingly, this Note cites both federal and state cases to interpret
these rules.
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should not treat the Federal Rules of Evidence as imposing per se
bans on polygraph evidence.
II. EIGHTY YEARS OF (LARGELY) EXCLUDING POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE
A. Corroborative Scientific Evidence
A polygraph examination forces its subject to recall past
events, and the polygrapher then evaluates the subject's physiological
responses during this recollection. 16  In the adjudicatory setting,
nothing prevents the subject from answering the same questions on a
witness stand. Polygraph results merely offer those using these tests
an evaluation of the subject's veracity in making a particular
statement. Although parties in the late 1800s argued that any
evidence beyond raw physical evidence and direct testimony was
irrelevant, 17 such challenges generally fail today. In fact, juries may
now hear extrapolations based on data that could not be offered as
independent evidence.18 Often, juries may not have the scientific
acumen to process such data, 19 but they may rely on expert witnesses
from each side to parse this information. 20  Polygraph results,
however, have not received the same deference that courts have given
to other types of scientific evidence.
16. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
17. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 81 N.W. 17 (Minn. 1899). In Smith, the Minnesota Supreme
Court considered a challenge to scientific evidence that addressed an eyewitness's credibility. A
prosecution expert conducted two experiments to determine what another witness could
legitimately have seen and heard from her vantage point. Although the court opinion noted that
such evidence offered no new information to the jury, it found admission of the evidence to be
appropriate on two grounds: first, the jurors had access to the raw information behind the
experiments' conclusions; second, each side could present a different interpretation of the raw
data. Id. at 18; see also Estate of Toomes, 54 Cal. 509, 514 (1880) (analyzing the nature of expert
testimony).
18. FED R. EVID. 703 states:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or
data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the
proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative
value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs
their prejudicial effect.
19. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (asserting that the purpose of expert testimony is to "assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence"); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir.
1923) (describing the use of expert witnesses when "inexperienced persons are unlikely to prove
capable of forming a correct judgment").
20. FED. R. EVID. 104(b), 702.
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B. Into the "Twilight Zone:" Frye's General Acceptance
The D.C. Circuit's decision to exclude polygraph evidence in the
1923 case Frye v. United States21 was the first in a series of decisions
to exclude polygraph evidence. 22 The Frye case involved the systolic
blood pressure test which, like other polygraph techniques, relied on
the hypothesis that deception required conscious effort. 23 In theory,
this effort would produce an emotional response throughout the
autonomic nervous system and raise systolic blood pressure by a
mechanically detectable amount.
24
The Frye court concluded that outside, expert witnesses may
explain their scientific findings in court, 25 but only if their evidence
met a series of rigorous requirements. 26 The court explained that
scientific evidence must evolve beyond an "experimental" phase into a
"demonstrable" one for courts to consider it.27 The panel
acknowledged the difficulty of applying its holding:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental
and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the
evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or
discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established
to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
2 8
The court concluded that the technique of measuring systolic blood
pressure to detect when a subject is lying "has not yet gained such
standing," and accordingly, the court barred the test results from
evidence.
29
21. 293 F. at 1014.




The rule is that the opinions of experts or skilled witnesses are admissible in evidence
in those cases in which the matter of inquiry is such that inexperienced persons are
unlikely to prove capable of forming a correct judgment upon it, for the reason that
the subject-matter so far partakes of a science, art, or trade as to require a previous
habit or experience or study in it, in order to acquire a knowledge of it. When the
question involved does not lie within the range of common experience or common
knowledge, but requires special experience or special knowledge, then the opinions of
witnesses skilled in that particular science, art, or trade to which the question relates
are admissible in evidence.
Id. (quoting the defendant's brief); see also National Gas Light & Fuel Co. v. Miethke, 35 Ill. App.
629, 629 (1890) (containing a similar passage and citing ROGERS ON EXPERT TESTIMONY § 10).
26. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
27. Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States,
a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1205 (1980).
28. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
29. Id.
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In the ensuing decades, courts used Frye to exclude most
proffered polygraph evidence.30  The Frye standard offered three
notable advantages. First, it kept the pool of scientific experts to a
minimum. 31  Second, it promoted decision uniformity.32  Third, and
most critically, the standard established a method for ensuring the
reliability of scientific evidence.
33
The Frye decision did not, however, require a complete bar of
all polygraph evidence. In fact, some courts admitted evidence that an
examination had occurred to corroborate a withdrawn confession,
while still barring the results. 34 The polygraph examinations in such
cases were not seen as prejudicial because courts concluded that a jury
is more likely to focus on the defendant's words than on the
polygrapher's scientific conclusions.3 5 In other exceptions at trial,
courts required both sides to stipulate to the admission of the
polygraph evidence, but even then, a judge could still bar the proffered
results. 36 Meanwhile, courts were generally, though only slightly,
more willing to admit polygraph results into evidence if the subject
was not a defense witness.
37
Frye's pervasive impact to exclude polygraph evidence
dampened in the early 1970s as three separate state courts held that
polygraph evidence now satisfied the "general acceptance" standard,
30. See, e.g., State v. Bohner, 246 N.W. 314, 317 (Wis. 1933) (following Frye's reasoning and
noting that it was the only such decision that the Bohner court could find); see also United States
v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1532 n.4 (11th Cir. 1989) (providing a brief history of federal cases
regarding polygraph evidence after Frye).
31. Giannelli, supra note 27, at 1207. Rule 403 concerns would later encapsulate this
thinking. See discussion infra Part III.B.
32. Giannelli, supra note 27, at 1207.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., State v. Melvin, 319 A.2d 450, 457-60 (N.J. 1974) (admitting polygraph results
where police officers had read the defendant his Miranda rights prior to the polygraph exam,
after which the defendant confessed, even though the rights-reading erroneously included
language about using what he said in his favor in court); Johnson v. State, 166 So. 2d 798, 801
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (admitting evidence related to a polygraph examination because the
polygraph evidence was not fruit of the poisonous tree); see also People v. McHenry, 22 Cal. Rptr.
621, 623-24 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (admitting statements made before polygraph examination).
35. See State v. DeHart, 8 N.W.2d 360, 362 (Wis. 1943) ('The thing that was prejudicial to
defendant was the confession which is many times more conclusive than any implication that
could be drawn from the fact of the lie detector test.").
36. See, e.g., State v. McDavitt, 297 A.2d 849, 854-55 (N.J. 1972) (holding that polygraph
evidence has achieved sufficient reliability to be admissible upon the stipulation of both parties);
State v. Valdez, 371 P.2d 894, 900 (Ariz. 1962) (allowing stipulated polygraph results to be
admitted and citing reliability studies in the process); see also State v. Chavez, 461 P.2d 919, 921
(N.M. 1969) (admitting stipulated polygraph results that went against the defendant).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Hart, 344 F. Supp. 522, 523-24 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (allowing
defendant to present evidence of a government witness's failed polygraph examination, but
barring defendant from presenting evidence of his own polygraph examination).
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and parties no longer needed to stipulate to its admission. 38 Although
courts seemed poised to admit polygraph evidence under the Frye
standard, legislatures retained significant control over admissibility,
and the state legislature in one of those states enacted a statutory ban
to exclude polygraph evidence. 39 Still, the pro-polygraph momentum
in the courts continued when the Seventh Circuit admitted expert
polygraph testimony to avoid a "swearing contest" over whether police
officers coerced a defendant's confession.40
In the 1980s, today's present circuit split emerged. While the
Fourth, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits maintained per se bans against
polygraphy, 41 other circuits became more accepting of it. In 1989, the
Eleventh Circuit declared in United States v. Piccinonna that, at least
in some instances, polygraphy satisfied Frye's required general
acceptance standard. 42 The divided en banc panel identified two
situations where polygraph testimony could be admissible: (1)
admission by stipulation; and (2) impeachment or corroboration of
witness testimony.43 The first category was consistent with previous
post-Frye developments. 44 The second category required polygraph
evidence to conform to the requirements of Rule 608.45  Thus,
polygraph evidence was permissible only in order to damage a
witness's credibility or after one side had already damaged a witness's
credibility.46 Meanwhile, the Eleventh Circuit maintained that other
evidentiary rules, including Rule 403, could continue to bar polygraph
evidence. 4
7
38. See James R. McCall, Misconceptions and Reevaluation-Polygraph Admissibility after
Rock and Daubert, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 381-89 (dissecting the following decisions:
Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 1), 313 N.E.2d 120 (Mass. 1974); State v. Dorsey, 539 P.2d 204
(N.M. 1975), affd for slightly different reasons, 532 P.2d 912 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975); Witherspoon
v. Superior Court, 183 Cal. Rptr. 615 (Ct. App. 1982)).
39. CAL. EVID. CODE § 351.1 (2006). See People v. Lee, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 828, 842 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002) (stating that California law "simply and unambiguously prohibits the admission of
evidence that a person took a polygraph test").
40. United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233, 1245 (7th Cir. 1979). The Third Circuit would
later follow this reasoning in United States v. Johnson, 816 F.2d 918, 923 (3d Cir. 1987).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Brevard, 739 F.2d 180, 182 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Clark, 598 F.2d 994, 995 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Skeens, 494 F.2d 1050, 1053 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
42. See United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir. 1989), superseded by
FED. R. EVID. 702, as recognized in In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litigation, 93 F. Supp.
1348, 1352 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
43. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1536.
44. Id. at 1534.
45. Id. at 1536.
46. Id.
47. Id. See discussion infra Part III.B.
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Although the Eleventh Circuit in Piccinonna had found that
polygraph evidence was admissible in some instances, on remand, the
district court barred the proffered polygraph evidence. 48 The court's
analysis focused on Rule 608(a) and (b) in evaluating the admissibility
of a polygraph test.49 Rule 608(a) admits general character evidence;
Rule 608(b) bars direct-examination testimony regarding specific
instances of character. 50 The court held that a single polygraph test
could not provide general character evidence admissible under Rule
608(a). 51 The court also held that polygraph results only proved "one
specific instance of truthfulness" and therefore failed under Rule
608(b).
52
The 1980s rulings on polygraphy coincided with broader
decisions to liberalize the admission of testimony from scientific
practices into evidence. In particular, the U.S. Supreme Court
rejected, on constitutional grounds, 58 evidentiary rules that barred
testimony obtained after hypnosis in Rock v. Arkansas.5 4 Although
the Supreme Court did not endorse questionable scientific
techniques, 55 the Court noted that the defendant's right to present
relevant testimony may "bow to accommodate other legitimate
interests in the criminal trial process."56
C. Daubert Consumes Frye
In the 1993 decision Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court held that the liberal attitude under the
Federal Rules of Evidence in favor of admitting relevant evidence
superseded Frye's requiring general acceptance to admit expert
48. United States v. Piccinonna, 729 F. Supp. 1336, 1338-39 (S.D. Fla. 1990), aff'd, 925
F.2d 1474 (11th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision).
49. Piccinonna, 729 F. Supp. at 1338.
50. FED. R. EVID. 608.
51. Piccinonna, 729 F. Supp. at 1338.
52. Id.
53. Because this Note focuses on the evidentiary rules, it discusses constitutionally based
arguments regarding polygraph evidence on only a basic level. Other scholarly writings have
saturated this field with varying criticism. They include: Richard A. Nagareda, Reconceiving the
Right to Present Witnesses, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1063 (1999) (focusing generally on the Scheffer IV
decision discussed infra Part II.F.2); Peter Westen, Egelhoff Again, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1203,
1273 (1999) (briefly discussing polygraph evidence); and Peter Westen, Confrontation and
Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REV. 567,
590-93 (1978) (discussing the defendant's right to direct examination of witnesses at trial).
54. 483 U.S. 44, 62 (1987).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 55 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)).
546 [Vol. 59:2:539
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scientific evidence. 57  Thus, Daubert clarified the threshold for
admitting evidence produced through a scientific technique.58 The
underlying goal was to ensure "that an expert's testimony rests on a
reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand."5 9 Under the
Court's new approach, general acceptance became just one
consideration in a broader, non-exclusive list of factors, including:60 (1)
a theory's submission to testing to determine its validity-in essence,
the scientific method; 61 (2) whether the theory has been subjected to
peer review and publication;62 (3) the known potential rate of error in
using a particular scientific technique and the existence and
maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation;63 and
(4) general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.64 The
Court subsequently held that Daubert applies to all scientific
evidence. 65 Courts following Daubert apply these factors to evaluate
the methodology and principles behind a particular expert witness's
technique, rather than solely evaluating the specific results of his
technique.66
The first Daubert factor, presence of the scientific method, is
largely preliminary. 67  Without the scientific process to create
scientific knowledge, the entire Daubert analysis would never be
triggered.68 Nonetheless, determining whether there is "scientific
knowledge" can be problematic because the determination does not
require absolute certainty as to a scientific assertion's truth.69
Instead, the Supreme Court required only validation based on "good
grounds" that the assertion be true. 70
57. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993).
58. Id. at 587-88.
59. Id. at 597.
60. The Daubert Court noted that these factors were only observations. The Justices did not
create a "definitive checklist or test." Id. at 593; August McCarthy, The Lost Futures of Lead-
Poisoned Children: Race-Based Damage Awards and the Limits of Constitutionality, 14 GEO.
MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 75, 88 n.61 (2004). Relevance could be articulated as another factor in
light of Rule 702's requirement that evidence assist the fact-finder. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591.
However, the Court treats it, along with scientific knowledge, as a preliminary issue to resolve
before continuing with the analysis. Id. at 592-93.
61. Id. at 589-90, 592-93.
62. Id. at 593.
63. Id. at 594.
64. Id.
65. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999).
66. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95.
67. See id. at 592-93.
68. See id. at 592.




Peer review and publication are somewhat easier to define.71
Publication is a form of peer review. 72 It subjects research to the
evaluation of others in the scientific community. 73 Peer responses to
published material then contribute to determining a technique's
validity.74
The Court provided little explanation of what is an acceptable
known potential rate of error. 75 It does, however, coincide with the
existence and maintenance of standards to provide predictable
results. 76  One procedure should produce the same result with
anticipated frequency.
77
The last factor-general acceptance-incorporated Frye's
standard.78 Widespread adoption of a technique likely constitutes
general acceptance; conversely, courts may view techniques that have
attracted minimal support with skepticism.
D. Daubert's Wake: The Door Briefly, and Slightly, Opens
The Daubert analysis prompted federal district courts to admit
polygraph evidence under Rule 702 in United States v. Crumby79 and
in United States v. Galbreth.80 Still, the most significant opinion to
follow Daubert-United States v. Posado8l-emerged from a pretrial
suppression hearing. In Posado, the Fifth Circuit held that, in light of
Daubert, courts could no longer bar polygraph evidence as per se
inadmissible under common law.8 2 However, much like the Supreme
Court's reluctance to endorse questionable scientific techniques in
71. Id. at 593.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 594.
75. See id. (observing only the importance of this consideration and providing case
parentheticals).
76. See id.
77. Id. at 593-94.
78. See id.
79. 895 F. Supp. 1354, 1363-64 (D. Ariz. 1995).
Thus, if the Defendant takes the stand and testifies that he did not commit the crime,
and the government impeaches his credibility, then the Defendant may support his
credibility with the use of the polygraph evidence. The credibility of the witness can
only be supported with evidence that Defendant took a polygraph examination in
connection with this case, and passed the examination.
Id. (relying on Rule 608(a) and to a lesser extent Rule 608(b)). Incidentally, the Crumby court
specifically disagreed with the Piccinonna district court's application of Rule 608 to polygraph
evidence. Id.
80. 908 F. Supp. 877, 896 (D.N.M. 1995) (noting that the inquiry was fact-specific).
81. 57 F.3d 428, 429 (5th Cir. 1995).
82. Id. at 434.
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Rock, the Fifth Circuit's decision did not specifically endorse the use of
polygraphy. 83 In fact, the court openly avoided a determination of the
reliability of polygraph results. 84 Instead, the panel simply concluded
that Daubert expanded the admissibility of scientific evidence. 85 On
remand, the trial court still barred the evidence as inadmissible under
Rules 702 and 403.86 Nevertheless, the Posado decision set a
precedent in rejecting per se common law exclusions, and the Ninth
Circuit would later adopt this reasoning.
87
E. The Supreme Court Enters the Fray: Polygraphy in Light of Scheffer
and Lile
1. Military Cases Force the Issue
A unique military evidentiary rule eventually forced the U.S.
Supreme Court to determine whether courts could exclude polygraph
evidence. Military cases are particularly unique in this area because
Congress has given the military express authorization to conduct
polygraph tests on its personnel.88 Not surprisingly, military courts
have been less inclined to reject the evidence as unreliable. In the
pre-Daubert case, United States v. Gipson, the U.S. Court of Military
Appeals concluded that polygraph results could be admissible to show
a defendant's truthfulness during the polygraph examination. 89 The
court conditioned such admissibility on "the competence of the
examiner, the suitability of the examinee, the nature of the particular
testing process employed, and such other factors as may arise."90 The
court also limited admissibility to those situations in which the
examiner testified as to the subject's truthfulness in an assertion at
the time of the examination, 91 essentially avoiding problems under
Rule 608. The jury could then evaluate the subject's credibility at the
83. Id.
84. See id. at 429.
85. See id. at 433. The panel did note that its decision might open a "Pandora's box." Id. at
436.
86. United States v. Ramirez, No. CRIM. H-93-252, 1995 WL 918083, at **2-5 (S.D. Tex.
Nov. 17, 1995).
87. United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 227-28 (9th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Cordoba 1].
88. See 29 U.S.C. § 2006 (2006); supra text accompanying notes 5-7.
89. United States v. Gipson, 24 M.J. 246, 253 (C.M.A. 1987), superseded by MIL. R. EVID.
707, as recognized in United States v. Scheffer, 44 M.J. 442, 44 (C.A.A.F. 1996) [hereinafter
Scheffer Il], rev'd, 523 U.S. 303 (1998).
90. See Gipson, 24 M.J. at 253.
91. Id. at 252-53.
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trial proceedings.92 Accordingly, even the prosecution could offer
polygraph evidence at trial.93  However, the ramifications of the
Military Court of Appeals' decision in Gipson were short-lived. Four
years after this decision, then-President George H. W. Bush
promulgated by executive order Military Rule of Evidence 707, 94 which
excluded all polygraph evidence from military courts.95
Per se rules against polygraph evidence, such as Military Rule
707, were seen as constitutionally suspect because they limited the
evidence that a defendant could present.96 The stage was set for the
Supreme Court to clarify--or at least attempt to clarify-the
disjointed appellate opinions on the admissibility of polygraph
evidence.
2. The Supreme Court Shifts the Discussion
The U.S. Supreme Court's first polygraph decision was a
relatively minor per curiam opinion. Nonetheless, this opinion was
the first in a series that deferred to the jurisdiction's treatment of
polygraph evidence. In Wood v. Bartholomew, the Supreme Court
held that a prosecutor did not violate the defendant's discovery
rights 97 by withholding evidence that two state witnesses had taken
polygraph exams. 98 Justifying its decision, the Court concluded that
92. Id. at 253.
93. Id. at 252.
94. MIL. R. EVID. 707 (hereinafter referred to as "Military Rule 707") states:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the results of a polygraph
examination, the opinion of a polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to take,
failure to take, or taking of a polygraph examination, shall not be admitted into
evidence.
(b) Nothing in this section is intended to exclude from evidence statements made
during a polygraph examination which are otherwise admissible.
95. Scheffer 1V, 523 U.S. at 306-07.
96. United States v. Williams, 39 M.J. 555, 558 (A.C.M.R. 1994), vacated on other grounds,
43 M.J. 348 (C.A.A.F. 1995). McCall, supra note 38, at 422. But see United States v. Lech, 895 F.
Supp. 582, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that per se inadmissibility did not run afoul of a
defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights). See generally John J. Canham, Jr., Military
Rule of Evidence 707: A Bright-Line Rule That Needs to Be Dimmed, 140 MIL. L. REV. 65 (1993)
(arguing that Rule 707 as a bright-line rule is flawed on policy and constitutional grounds).
97. These rights are more commonly referred to as Brady discovery. The prosecution must
disclose potential exculpatory evidence. See generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)
(discussing the disclosure requirement). Wood v. Bartholomew posed the question of whether
disclosure was necessary when the local evidentiary rules would otherwise have excluded the
evidence under most circumstances. 516 U.S. 1, 6 (1995). But see generally Conley v. United
States, 323 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2003) (remanding the case for review when the prosecution withheld
unfavorable Brady evidence); Conley v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 2d 302 (D. Mass. 2004)
(ordering a new trial because the prosecution withheld the unfavorable polygraph results).
98. Wood, 516 U.S. at 5-6.
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shielding the favorable results from the defendant did not affect the
outcome at trial because the state's highest court generally rejected
polygraph evidence anyway. 99
Three years later, in United States v. Scheffer, the Court
addressed Military Rule of Evidence 707 and held that per se bans on
polygraph testimony do not necessarily violate a defendant's
constitutional rights.100  This decision was the Court's first-and
only-decision directly addressing the admissibility of polygraph
evidence. 10 1 In Scheffer, eight Justices agreed on two points: (1) the
disputed reliability of polygraph results created a valid government
interest in restricting their use;10 2 and (2) the rule barring such
evidence did not violate the defendant's constitutional due process
rights.10 3  Interestingly, only a four-Justice plurality-minority
10 4
rejected polygraph evidence as infringing on the jury's role in
determining credibility.' 0 5 Similarly, a majority could not conclude
that litigating polygraph evidence would distract a jury from the guilt-
innocence determination.
While Scheffer held rules barring polygraph evidence to be
constitutional, the Court upheld a law that potentially permitted
polygraph evidence to be admitted against defendants in McKune v.
Lile.10 6 The Lile case involved a state law that required submission to
polygraph testing as a sentencing condition. 07 However, under this
law, the polygraph session could be admissible against the inmate at
subsequent criminal proceedings.' 08 The Lile inmate had testified at
trial and was thus vulnerable to prosecution for perjury for any
conflicting statements made during the polygraph examinations that
were part of his treatment. 0 9 Through this decision, the Supreme
99. Id. at 6 (citing Bartholomew v. Wood, 34 F.3d 870, 875 (9th Cir. 1994), which concluded
that Washington state courts rejected polygraph evidence). Interestingly, this common-law
treatment precedes the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See generally State v.
Woo, 527 P.2d 271 (Wash. 1974) (barring polygraph evidence).
100. Scheffer V, 523 U.S. at 315.
101. Wood v. Bartholomew focused on the prosecution's failure to disclose the unfavorable
polygraph results, not their ultimate admissibility. Wood, 516 U.S. at 8.
102. Scheffer IV, 523 U.S. at 309-12.
103. Id. at 315-17.
104. Four Justices supported Justice Kennedy's concurrence instead of these sections. Id. at
318. The ninth, Justice Stevens, dissented from the prevailing exclusion. He would have
admitted the polygraph evidence. Id. at 320. Combining dissenting and concurring positions
suggests that Justice Thomas wrote for a minority position, rather than a plurality.
105. Id. at 312-14.
106. McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 47-48 (2002).
107. Id. at 30.




Court again deferred to the local jurisdiction in how it chose to use
polygraph evidence. In essence, the Supreme Court has upheld a rule
that barred polygraph evidence and a law that would admit it.
F. Scheffer's Wake
The momentum in favor of polygraph evidence subsided after
Scheffer. Multiple federal circuit courts cited the decision as
approving of per se rules against polygraph admissibility as well as for
the general proposition that polygraph evidence is unreliable. 1 0 The
Seventh Circuit even misconstrued Scheffer to stand for the
proposition that courts should exclude polygraph evidence because it
infringes on the jury's responsibilities."'
Some circuit courts have interpreted Scheffer more narrowly in
a manner favorable to admitting polygraph evidence. 1 2 For example,
the Eighth Circuit cited Scheffer for the proposition that "categorical
exclusions of evidence that 'significantly undermined fundamental
elements of the defendant's case"' remained unconstitutional.
113
Against this background, in the summer of 2004, the New Mexico
Supreme Court went further than any other U.S. jurisdiction had gone
and admitted polygraph evidence at trial.
114
G. New Mexico Opens its Floodgates
In Lee v. Martinez, the New Mexico Supreme Court applied a
comprehensive Daubert analysis to admit polygraph evidence under
New Mexico Rule of Evidence 702.115 The state supreme court
interpreted Daubert to contain three factors: testability; peer review
and publication; and rate of error.1' 6 In this case, the court requested
that a special judge conduct a thorough review of polygraph reliability
and its admissibility in other jurisdictions."17  Interestingly, the
110. E.g., Castillo v. Johnson, 141 F.3d 218, 222 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Scheffer JV for its
assertion that polygraphs are unreliable).
111. United States v. Lea, 249 F.3d 632, 639 (7th Cir. 2001).
112. The First Circuit has largely avoided the issue of admissibility. See, e.g., Conley v.
United States, 332 F. Supp. 2d 302, 319 n.16 (D. Mass. 2004).
113. Newman v. Hopkins, 247 F.3d 848, 852-53 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Scheffer IM). The
Eighth Circuit has not declared per se exclusions unconstitutional. Id.
114. See discussion infra Part II.H.
115. Lee v. Martinez, 96 P.3d 291, 306 (N.M. 2004). Although New Mexico's Rule 707
provides special conditions for admitting polygraph evidence that are not present in other
jurisdictions, it did not affect the Lee court's Daubert analysis. Id.
116. See discussion supra note 60.
117. Lee, 96 P.3d at 293-94.
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special judge concluded that polygraph evidence was too unproven to
present at trial. 118 Nevertheless, the New Mexico high court held that
Daubert's tenets mandated admission of a particular polygraph
technique--the question control technique. 119
For the testability factor, the court relied heavily on a 2003
report from the National Academy of Sciences ("NAS"). 120 This report
found polygraph evidence to be reliable in many circumstances.
1 21
More relevant for Daubert purposes, the court cited this reliability as
creating the ability to test polygraph results. 22 As a result, the court
held that polygraph evidence met the first Daubert prong,
testability. 123
The New Mexico Supreme Court next concluded that the
particular polygraph technique met the second prong of Daubert, peer
review and publication. 124 Again citing the NAS Report, the court
noted the committee's identification of 102 separate studies that were
"deemed of sufficient quality" for inclusion in the report.1 25 The court
reached this conclusion despite the committee's determination that
many of these studies "do not generally reach the high levels of
research quality desired in science."1 26  Instead, the New Mexico
justices focused on the publication of many of these studies in "good-
quality, peer-reviewed journals."' 27 Both the state and the defendant
had submitted analyses about the accuracy of polygraph results, and
the court focused on the publication of these differing analyses in
scientific journals rather than on their conflicting scientific
conclusions.128
Lastly, the New Mexico court concluded that the polygraph test
in question satisfied the third prong of Daubert because it exhibited an
acceptable rate of error.1 29 The court cited the NAS Report for a
118. Id. at 322 app.
119. Id. at 306.
120. The court described the body as "a private, non-profit society of distinguished scientists
and engineers that advises the federal government on scientific and technical matters." Id. at
295.
121. Id. at 294 (citing NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, THE
POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION 13 (2003), available at http://www.nap.edulopenbook/030908436
9/html [hereinafter NAS Report]).
122. Lee, 96 P.3d at 298, 306.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 300.
125. Id. (citing NAS Report, supra note 121, at 107).
126. Lee, 96 P.3d at 300 (citing NAS Report, supra note 121, at 108).
127. Lee, 96 P.3d at 300.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 301-02.
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median 89 percent success rate in field studies.130 Notably, the report
had expressed concern over the extent to which real-world polygraph
application would lead to false positives that would incriminate the
innocent. 131
In the months since Lee v. Martinez, only the Georgia Supreme
Court and three state appellate courts have had the opportunity to
cite the decision.1 32 Accordingly, its impact on other jurisdictions will
remain unclear for the next several years. Nonetheless, by relying on
Daubert, the New Mexico Supreme Court analyzed a specific process
grounded in studies rather than categorically dismissing the process's
results. Accordingly, its thorough Rule 702 analysis provided a means
for admitting polygraph results into evidence that other states and the
federal courts may adopt.
III. ONE COMMON EVIDENTIARY ROADMAP WITH MULTIPLE
ANALYTICAL DETOURS
Virtually all jurisdictions use the same basic evidentiary rules
in assessing polygraphy's admissibility. Relevance, however, is not
among the grounds for rejecting polygraph evidence. Reliable
polygraph results comply with Rule 40i's requirement that proffered
evidence make a fact's existence more or less probable.1 33 In addition,
polygraph evidence avoids hearsay objections as long as a polygraph
examiner's testimony is not offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted. 13
4
Five significant evidentiary mechanisms have been used by
courts to bar polygraph testimony. The Federal Rules of Evidence and
their state equivalents pose the first four roadblocks, as courts have
inappropriately warped most of these rules beyond their general
application into serving as per se bans. Statutory per se bans against
polygraph admissibility provide the fifth roadblock and offer what
should be the most enduring basis for the exclusion of polygraph
130. Id. at 301 (citing NAS Report, supra note 121, at 125, wherein the interquartile range
for all field studies was 71.1 to 99.9 percent).
131. Lee, 96 P.3d at 314 app.
132. Height v. State, 604 S.E.2d 796, 798 (Ga. 2004); State v. Shaneyfelt, 695 N.W.2d 506,
506 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (declining to admit unstipulated polygraph results); State v. Kerby, 118
P.3d 740, 749 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005); In re D.S., 828 N.E.2d 143, 150 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
133. FED. R. EVID. 401. This statement assumes, of course, that the evidence presented will
correspond to an issue at trial.
134. 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 353.1 (2d
ed. 1994); see also United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 99 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (suggesting
that then-proposed Rule 703 would permit a polygraph examiner testifying as an expert witness
to use hearsay evidence in the opinion that he presented to the jury).
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evidence. This Part will first examine Rule 702, which some courts
use to bar polygraph evidence categorically rather than adopting a
case-specific application. Second, it will explore Rule 403, which some
courts misapply to turn a case-specific, catch-all provision into a per se
ban. Third, this Part will examine Rule 608, which some courts
misuse as a relevance bar. Fourth, this Part will address Rule 704(b),
which bars all mens rea expert testimony, and which courts essentially
construe as a statutory per se exclusion. Finally, this Part will
conclude by briefly examining statutory per se rules barring actus reus
and mens rea polygraph evidence and concluding that these statutory
rules are the most appropriate means of excluding polygraph evidence.
A. Rule 702: Relying too Heavily on Scheffer
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
13 5
Because it controls all scientific evidence, Rule 702 is the
primary barrier to the admissibility of polygraph evidence. At least
two commentators have argued that polygraph admissibility should
turn solely on a court's application of Rule 702.136 Unfortunately,
many trial courts have inconsistently applied Daubert's interpretation
of Rule 702 while others overemphasize certain Daubert factors.
137
Furthermore, the appellate process does little to rectify the problem
because the abuse of discretion standard makes overturning
exclusionary rulings difficult, if not impossible. 138
Today, courts addressing the admissibility of polygraph
evidence generally focus on "reliability."139 However, some treat
"reliability" in a way that merely rearticulates Frye's general
acceptance standard. These courts effectively treat Rule 702 as a per
se ban without any Daubert analysis.
135. FED. R. EVID. 702.
136. Edward J. Imwinkelried & James R. McCall, Issues Once Moot: The Other Evidentiary
Objections to the Admission of Exculpatory Polygraph Examinations, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1045, 1051, 1080-81 (1997) (focusing on the impropriety of using Rule 608 to exclude polygraph
evidence); see also Henseler, supra note 12, at 1279 (arguing that Daubert does not compel the
admission of polygraph evidence under Rule 702).
137. United States v. Henderson, 409 F.3d 1293, 1303 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that
reasonable judges can disagree over polygraph admissibility).
138. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 142 (1999) (citing General Electric Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997)).
139. See, e.g., United States v. Lea, 249 F.3d 632, 639 (7th Cir. 2001).
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Recent decisions cite Scheffer's finding of disagreement within
the scientific community as to polygraphy's reliability. The Court in
Scheffer explained, "there is simply no consensus that polygraph
evidence is reliable. To this day, the scientific community remains
extremely polarized about the reliability of polygraph techniques."'
140
The Eighth Circuit in United States v. Rouse emphasized this
language in upholding a trial court's decision to exclude polygraph
evidence. 141 The Eighth Circuit only mentioned Daubert; it neither
quoted the text of Rule 702 nor articulated any Daubert factors. 142 In
fact, only 326 words of the opinion's 2,757 words, or 11.8 percent,
addressed the issue. 143 Conversely, 23.4 percent of the 7,400 words in
the district court's opinion discussed this issue. 44 By contrast, the key
appellant brief 45 devoted 3,053 of its 5,118 words, or 59.7 percent, to
the polygraph issue; the shorter government reply devoted 867 of its
1391 words, or 62.3 percent, to this issue. The Eight Circuit panel,
however, attempted to make the simple Scheffer citation dispositive of
a more complicated issue. Other opinions similarly cite Scheffer as
dispositive in their Rule 702 analysis. 146 Scheffer, however, only
addressed a per se inadmissibility rule and thus never needed to
conduct a Daubert analysis. 147 Accordingly, the lack of scientific
consensus cited in Scheffer should not end the Daubert analysis.
140. See Scheffer IV, 523 U.S. 303, 309 (1998). This polarization of opinion is reflected in
both state and federal opinions. See, e.g., United States v. Rouse, 410 F.3d 1005, 1011 n.3 (8th
Cir. 2005) (noting the lack of consensus regarding reliability); State v. McHoney, 544 S.E.2d 30,
35 (S.C. 2001).
141. Rouse, 410 F.3d at 1011.
142. Id.
143. Id. The word count of the opinion body, including footnotes, was performed using a copy
of.the opinion obtained through Westlaw. Unfortunately, party briefs were not available to
determine how much space the parties devoted to these arguments.
144. United States v. Rouse, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (D.S.D. 2004).
145. Appellant's Brief, United States v. Rouse, 410 F. 3d 1005 (8th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-1470),
available at http://www.ca8.uscourts.govlbriefs/04/06/appellant/041470_- lbr.pdf (last visited Mar.
31, 2006). Because the case had four appellants, four appellant briefs were filed. This brief refers
to appellant Russell Hubbeling.
146. See, e.g., State v. McHoney, 544 S.E.2d 30, 35 (S.C. 2001). The South Carolina Supreme
Court, which has adopted Daubert, devoted minimal attention in its opinion to polygraph
arguments under the state's equivalent of Rule 702. Alice B. Lustre, Post-Daubert Standards for
Admissibility of Scientific and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R.5th 453 (2005).
Only 582 of the McHoney opinion's 4,199 words, or 13.9 percent, discussed polygraphy. 544
S.E.2d 30. The opinion did not delve into legal analysis but, unlike Rouse, restated South
Carolina's Rule 702. Id. at 35 n.4. The party briefs were unavailable. See also United States v.
Canter, 338 F. Supp. 2d 460, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y 2004) (citing Scheffer IV in support of the court's
decision not to perform a Daubert analysis because the evidence was too unreliable).
147. Scheffer IV, 523 U.S. 303, 312 (1998). For further discussion of a prematurely halted




Courts occasionally misapply Daubert's key tenets in analyzing
polygraph evidence. For example, the Ninth Circuit conducted a
thorough Daubert analysis in United States v. Cordoba.148  Its
conclusion, however, focused on the uncertainty as to whether a
polygraph instrument functioned correctly in a particular application.
The court wrote, "The accuracy obtained in one situation or research
study may not generalize to different situations or to different types of
persons being tested."'149 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has not
focused solely on scientific results themselves. Instead, it has focused
on the polygrapher's "principles and methodology"' 5 0 -in essence, his
technique-and analytical separation between the data and the
opinion proffered151-in essence, the basis that provided for his
conclusion. The Kumho Tire opinion further explains Daubert's
reliability requirement for any scientific methodology: "[T]he specific
issue before the court was not the reasonableness in general of a tire
expert's use of a visual and tactile inspection. . . . The relevant issue
was whether the expert could reliably determine the cause of this
tire's separation."'' 52 In Cordoba, however, the court held polygraphy
to be unreliable in general, and it did not focus its analysis on the
particular technique employed. 53 In light of post-Daubert case law,
the Cordoba panel should have narrowed its Daubert analysis to the
specific technique proffered'5 4 rather than rejecting polygraphy in
general.
Even if the Cordoba court had addressed the specific technique
rather than polygraphy in general, the decision reveals a fundamental
limitation of Daubert and its progeny: how reliable must a specific
technique be to pass muster? The Cordoba panel cited various studies
that estimated polygraphy's general success rate to be between 50 and
87 percent as further evidence that the proffered polygraph results
failed the Daubert test. 55 A court giving greater weight to the studies
that found polygraphy to be 87 percent reliable could have decided the
148. United States v. Cordoba, 194 F.3d 1053, 1056-62 (9th Cir. 1999) [hereafter Cordoba I]
(citing the same language from Scheffer IV but using that language only in support of the court's
ultimate conclusion, rather than short-circuiting its Daubert analysis).
149. Id. at 1059 (quoting OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, SCIENTIFIC
VALIDITY OF POLYGRAPH TESTING 102 (1983), available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu
/ota/disk3/1983/8320_n.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2006)).
150. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594-95 (1993).
151. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
152. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 15354 (1999).
153. See Cordoba II, 194 F.3d at 1058-62 (frequently referring to polygraph evidence as a
whole rather than to the particular exam).
154. Id. at 1057-58 (elaborating on the controlled question technique).
155. Cordoba II, 194 F.3d at 1060 (citing Scheffer IV, 523 U.S. 303, 309 (1998)).
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reliability question differently. 156  Without isolating a particular
technique in the reliability discussion, however, different success rates
create meaningless comparisons.
Although this Part focuses on how courts misapply Rule 702
and Daubert to exclude polygraph evidence, a Daubert analysis does
not necessitate admission of polygraph evidence. 157 In United States v.
Gilliard, for instance, the Eleventh Circuit properly excluded
polygraph evidence after concluding that an examiner's particular
technique lacked sufficient peer review. 158 Conceivably, additional
peer review would allow the prosecution to present evidence to refute
a particular test's validity. Any time a court cites to certain factors, or
lack thereof, it leaves open the possibility of changing its decision in
the future if those factors change. Accordingly, as researchers develop
more evidence of a polygraph technique's reliability-which is
certainly possible, if not likely-Rule 702 will be less of an obstacle to
the admissibility of polygraph results.
B. Rule 403: An Alternative Balancing Test
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence. 159
Some courts misinterpret Rule 403 as presenting a per se bar
to the admission of polygraph evidence. The advisory committee's
note on Rule 403 recognizes that "certain circumstances call for the
exclusion of evidence which is of unquestioned relevance. 1 60 By
excluding such evidence, Rule 403 prevents the jury from making "its
decision based on unfair considerations which do not relate to the
issues in the case.' 161 The rule imposes a fact-specific inquiry that
requires these concerns to outweigh substantially the probative value
156. See discussion supra Part IL.H regarding Lee v. Martinez, 96 P.3d 291 (N.M. 2004). But
see Brown v. Darcy, 783 F.2d 1389, 1396-97 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Providing the jury with an all or
nothing evaluation of credibility and then telling the jury that this evaluation has an eighty
percent to ninety percent chance of being accurate if the polygraph was properly administered
interferes with, rather than enhances, the deliberative process."). Brown's bright-line test was
subsequently overruled by Daubert. Cordoba I, 104 F.3d 225, 228 (1997).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Gilliard, 133 F.3d 809, 814-15 (11th Cir. 1998) (providing a
test-specific anqlysis).
158. Id. at 814.
159. FED. R. EVID. 403.
160. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
161. ANTHONY BOCCHINO & DAVID A. SONENSHEIN, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FEDERAL
EVIDENCE: OBJECTIONS, RESPONSES, RULES, AND PRACTICE COMMENTARY 34 (rev. 4th ed. 1999).
558 [Vol. 59:2:539
WARPING THE RULES
of proffered evidence. 162 Courts have held that this rule should be
applied "only sparingly since the evidence excluded is concededly
probative." 163  Thus, the rule does not govern entire classes of
evidence. Instead, other rules govern class exclusions, subject to a
case-specific Rule 403 analysis as a concluding step.164 Although other
rules may affect a Rule 403 analysis, 165 some courts start and end
their polygraph admissibility analysis with Rule 403.
Sometimes, courts use Rule 403 to usurp Daubert. In United
States v. Lea, for example, the defendant argued that the court should
only consider Rule 403's listed considerations when assessing the
admissibility of polygraph evidence. 166 The Seventh Circuit disagreed,
however, holding that it could perform its analysis of polygraph
evidence admissibility under either Rule 403 or under Rule 702. The
panel cited Justice Thomas's lead opinion in Scheffer 167 for the notion
that "the jury is the lie detector."'168 The court then properly noted
that although reliability falls within a Daubert analysis, such concerns
"may also become an integral part of a 403 inquiry."1 69  The panel
went even further and declared a Rule 403 analysis to be an
alternative to the Daubert framework. The court noted that "a district
court need not conduct a full Daubert analysis in order to determine
the admissibility of standard polygraph evidence, and instead may
examine the evidence under a Rule 403 framework."'170 Because the
polygraph evidence in this case was excluded under Rule 403, the
appellate panel did not even consider the defendant's argument that
the trial court erred by not conducting a full Daubert analysis. 171 This
omitted reasoning is particularly unusual given the tendency of
162. FED. R. EVID. 403.
163. Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 453 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Blancha v. Raymark Indus.,
972 F.2d 507, 516 (3d Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted)).
164. For instance, Rule 702 would provide grounds for excluding an evidentiary category,
such as polygraph evidence, if the science were insufficient. Polygraph evidence, however, would
seem to have met this standard. See discussion supra Part III.A.
165. For instance, in United States v. Castillo, the district court used Rule 403 in further
support of its excluding polygraph evidence under Rule 608(a). No. 96-CR-430, 1997 WL 83746,
at *2 (E.D. Penn. Feb. 19, 1997) (order denying defendant's motion to admit polygraph evidence).
166. United States v. Lea, 249 F.3d 632, 639 (7th Cir. 2001).
167. The panel, however, declared it to be the court's majority opinion. Id. Only two circuit
courts have specifically acknowledged that this aspect of Scheffer IV is, at most, a plurality
opinion. See Morris v. Burnett, 319 F.3d 1254, 1275 (10th Cir. 2003); Miskel v. Karnes, 397 F.3d
446, 455 (6th Cir. 2005).
168. Lea, 249 F.3d at 639 (quoting Scheffer IV, 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1998)). The citation
appears in Part II.B of the Scheffer IV opinion, to which only four Justices agreed.
169. Lea, 249 F.3d at 639. This notion is consistent with using Rule 403 in conjunction with a
less generic, more category-specific rule.




intermediate appellate courts to address issues fully in order to avoid
a higher court's later ordering them to do so.1
72
Interestingly, the Lea panel did not discuss the high threshold
necessary to exclude evidence under Rule 403; instead it referenced
Rule 403 as imposing a mere "balancing test."'173 In omitting this
discussion, the court seems to have misinterpreted Rule 403 to have
the same effect as Rule 702 and Daubert. Daubert is itself a
consideration of many factors, 17 4 but its test is separate from that of
Rule 403.175 Unlike Rule 403, Daubert considerations do not presume
the admission of evidence. 176 Rule 403 only excludes evidence when
probative value of this evidence is "substantially outweighed" by other
concerns.
177
Even the pre-Daubert Eleventh Circuit overemphasized Rule
403's importance in Piccinonna.178 Both the Eleventh Circuit and,
later, the Ninth Circuit held that Rule 403 could exclude polygraph
evidence by a simple balancing test of probative value against Rule
403's concerns. 179 The Piccinonna decision suggests that the judges
remained reluctant to admit polygraph results into evidence despite
finding that polygraphy had achieved general acceptance.18 0
The Piccinonna court's half-hearted grounds for refusing
admission of polygraph evidence may reflect concerns about
maintaining the traditional role of juries in assessing credibility. For
non-stipulated admission, the court only permitted polygraph evidence
to assist the fact-finder in assessing credibility; the defendant could
not wield polygraphy as the final word on the charges against him.' 8'
172. The principle is logical and practical. If a higher court rejects that single notion, it will
likely remand the case for the lower court to decide the appeal based on the remaining issues. If
the lower court addresses each issue, however, then the higher court is less likely to remand the
case for further review.
173. Lea, 249 F.3d. at 640.
174. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993).
175. United States v. Ramirez-Robles, 386 F.3d 1234, 1246 (9th Cir. 2004).
176. See id. at 1245-46 ("[Any kind of evidence may be excluded [under Rule 403] if its
probative value will be substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact.... Daubert, on the
other hand, establishes a standard by which the court must evaluate expert testimony for its
reliability before admitting it into court.") (emphasis added).
177. Id. at 1245.
178. See United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1536 (11th Cir. 1989) (applying Rule
403 as a catch-all).
179. See id.; United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 1989).
180. See Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1536 (emphasizing the narrow holding and the trial court's
discretion for excluding polygraph evidence on other grounds).
181. Id. at 1536-37. No court has held that polygraph tests would be admissible as
conclusive proof of innocence or guilt.
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Thus, this reformulation of Rule 403 seems to incorporate a public
policy desire to preserve the fact-finder's role at trial.
Some courts apply Rule 403 with such regularity as to nullify
its effectiveness. For instance, the Sixth Circuit relied on Rule 403 in
at least three criminal opinions to reject polygraph evidence without
examining the possible effect that Daubert could have on this
evidence.18 2 Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit still holds that polygraph
evidence is not per se inadmissible.18 3 Arguably, however, the Sixth
Circuit applies Rule 403 with such frequency that it has transformed
this rule from an option of last resort into the equivalent of a per se
bar.
Although courts have overemphasized Rule 403 in barring
polygraph evidence outright, they have paid little attention to Rule
403 in analyzing the defendant's evidentiary alternatives to
presenting polygraph evidence. Nonetheless, these alternatives may
be the most appropriate application of the rule. Most notably, the U.S.
Supreme Court held in Old Chief v. United States that the prosecution
must accept the defendant's stipulation to past criminal convictions
under Rule 403.184 Although this holding does not contribute directly
to the determination of polygraph admissibility, the dicta of its
supporting reasoning is useful here:
[When a court considers "whether to exclude on grounds of unfair prejudice," the
"availability of other means of proof may ... be an appropriate factor." The point gets a
reprise in the Notes to Rule 404(b), dealing with admissibility when a given evidentiary
item has the dual nature of legitimate evidence of an element and illegitimate evidence
of character: "No mechanical solution is offered. The determination must be made
whether the danger of undue prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence in
view of the availability of other means of proof and other facts appropriate for making
decision of this kind under 403." Thus the notes leave no question that when Rule 403
confers discretion by providing that evidence "may" be excluded, the discretionary
judgment may be informed not only by assessing an evidentiary item's twin tendencies,
but by placing the result of that assessment alongside similar assessments of evidentiary
alternatives. 
18 5
Accordingly, the best application of Rule 403 to polygraph evidence
may be through a recalculation of its probative value in light of other
evidence. Courts can follow Old Chief in their Rule 403 analyses and
determine the benefits a party may obtain if allowed to use polygraph
182. United States v. Thomas, 167 F.3d 299, 308 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting that the Sixth
Circuit "generally disfavor[s] admitting the results of polygraph examinations"). The Sixth
Circuit has not considered Daubert's impact on polygraph admissibility. Id. at 309 n.8 (citing
United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1216 (6th Cir. 1995), and Conti v. Commissioner, 39 F.3d
658, 662-63 (6th Cir. 1994)).
183. United States v. Odom, 13 F.3d 949, 957 (6th Cir. 1994).
184. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 191-92 (1997).
185. Id. at 184-85 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
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results in light of the benefits possible through using alternative
evidence. For instance, a court could exclude polygraph evidence in
light of eyewitness testimony.
Rule 403 offers little to the evidentiary analysis when courts
treat it as duplicative of Rule 702. Instead, courts should only use
Rule 403 to exclude polygraph evidence under case-specific
circumstances, such as redundancy of evidence or the risk of unfair
prejudice in light of the evidence's proffered purpose.
8 6
C. Rule 608: Credibility as a Relevance Link
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness may be
attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to
these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the
character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation
evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the
purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' character for truthfulness, other than
conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.
They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the
witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness
being cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not
operate as a waiver of the accused's or the witness' privilege against self-incrimination
when examined with respect to matters that relate only to character for truthfulness. 187
Although courts primarily focus on Rules 702 and 403 in
considering whether to admit polygraph evidence, the few courts that
have conducted a Rule 608 analysis have often concluded that the
proffered polygraph results relate to the subject's character for
truthfulness. As a result, these courts have effectively treated Rule
608 as a per se bar to admitting polygraph evidence.
Whether Rule 608 should even apply to polygraph results is
open to debate. Under Rule 608(a), evidence supportive of a character
for truthfulness is only permissible when the opposing side has
already attacked a witness's character for truthfulness. 8 8 Under Rule
608(b), specific examples of an untruthful character are admissible
186. For instance, profferred polygraph evidence could skirt Rule 608 so closely as to make
Rule 403's exclusion of it appropriate.
187. FED. R. EVID. 608.
188. FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
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only on cross-examination.1 8 9 Character-based testimony, however, is
only one way of attacking credibility, 190 and a harsh cross-examination
does not necessarily amount to a character-based attack.19'
Furthermore, a party offering polygraph evidence normally offers the
results through the examiner's testimony for their asserted truth,
particularly toward reinforcing a witness's credibility. Proponents
rarely offer polygraph evidence to show good character, and therefore,
Rule 608 should almost never apply.
Several sources suggest that Rule 608 should never apply when
assessing the admissibility of polygraph evidence. In Gipson, the U.S.
Court of Military Appeals held that although "polygraph evidence
relates to the credibility of a certain statement, it does not relate to
the declarant's character."'192  Similarly, Professors Edward
Imwinkelried and James McCall have argued that polygraph
testimony would not require the jury to make any of the character
inferences that the drafters or Rule 608 feared. 93 They contend that
polygraph evidence only reveals a particular act of truthfulness.1
94
Accordingly, such evidence does not go toward proving a truthful
character, and the worst significant inference that a juror might draw
is that the accused is conscious of his innocence.
195
189. FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
190. See, e.g., Lanham v. Commonwealth, 171 S.W.3d 14, 23 (Ky. 2005) (discussing
application of Kentucky's analogue to Rule 608(a)); United States v. Bedonie, 913 F.2d 782, 802
(10th Cir. 1990) (discussing character for truthfulness as an example of an attack on witness
credibility)
191. United States v. Thomas, 768 F.2d 611, 618 (5th Cir. 1985).
192. United States v. Gipson, 24 M.J. 246, 252 (C.M.A. 1987), superseded by MIL. R. EVID.
707. The court elaborated further in a footnote:
For this reason, we reject the Government's alternate contention that Mil.R.Evid.
608(a)(2) and (b) bar use of polygraph evidence. Mil.R.Evid. 608(a)(2) allows
admission of "evidence of truthful character... only after the character of the witness
for truthfulness has been attacked." As the Government points out, appellant's
character was not attacked. However, since the rule addresses character evidence,
and polygraph evidence is not character evidence, the rule is inapposite. A like result
disposes of the Government's Mil.R.Evid. 608(b) argument. That rule generally
prohibits use of "extrinsic evidence," "other than conviction of crime," to prove
"[s]pecific instances of conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting
the credibility of the witness." Evidence of such conduct (usually misconduct) is
adduced for the inferences that might be drawn about the witness' character for
credibility. Again, since polygraph results do not reveal character, they are not barred
by the rule.
Id. at 252 n.8. Of course, the Scheffer decision had the effect of overruling Gipson, but that
decision only related to the constitutionality of a per se rule against polygraph evidence.
193. Imwinkelried & McCall, supra note 136, at 1074-79 (including diagram).
194. Id. at 1078.
195. Id. (suggesting that polygraph evidence has probative value under a "consciousness of
innocence" theory).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Most courts that allow polygraph evidence to survive Rules 702
and 403 seemingly treat Rule 608 as a compromise position that
practically limits the effect of those prior determinations to admit
polygraph results. The Eleventh Circuit acting en banc in Piccinonna
held that under Rule 608, polygraph evidence would only be
admissible if a witness's character for truthfulness had already been
called into question. 196 On remand, the trial court held that a single
polygraph examination was insufficient to constitute general opinion
evidence of character under Rule 608(a). 197 Similarly, the court in
Lee-to date, the most accepting of polygraph evidence--considered
whether Rule 608(b) applied. 198 The Lee court suggested that a special
New Mexico evidentiary rule might have created an exception to Rule
608(b) for polygraph evidence. 199
Whether polygraph evidence is admissible under Rule 608(a)
turns on a court's definition of "opinion" evidence. In United States v.
Thomas, the Fifth Circuit questioned the admissibility of a
polygrapher's opinion testimony regarding his subject's
truthfulness. 200 The trial court rejected the polygraph results, and the
Fifth Circuit concluded that exclusion was appropriate because the
prosecution had not challenged the subject's credibility. 20' The
Thomas court cited a separate district court decision that effectively
excluded all opinion testimony as to credibility under Rule 608(a) if
this testimony did not address a defendant's character for
truthfulness. 20 2  The Fifth Circuit held that the district court's
196. United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1536 (11th Cir. 1989). The court did not
specify whether the evidence would be admissible under Rule 608(a) or (b). Presumably, Rule
608(a) would apply, because it permits opinion testimony in response to evidence showing a
truthful character. Meanwhile, the four-person dissent took exception to admitting the evidence
under Rule 608. Id. at 1537 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
197. United States v. Piccinonna, 729 F. Supp. 1336, 1338 (S.D. Fla. 1990). The Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the decision without a published opinion. United States v. Piccinonna, 925 F.2d
1474 (11th Cir. 1991).
198. Lee v. Martinez, 96 P.3d 291, 294-95 (N.M. 2004).
199. Id.
200. 768 F.2d 611, 618-19 (5th Cir. 1985).
201. Id. at 618.
202. Id. (citing United States v. Earley, 505 F. Supp. 117, 120 (S.D. Iowa 1981)). Earley
stated:
A polygraphist expresses his opinion, but he expresses it as to whether the subject of
the polygraph examination spoke truthfully or untruthfully on the specific occasion of
the polygraph examination. The polygraphist does not express his opinion of the
subject's "character for truthfulness or untruthfulness." Thus the opinion testimony of
the polygraphist is not within the express limitation Rule 608(a) places on opinion
testimony relative to the credibility of a witness.
505 F. Supp. at 120 (quoting FED R. EVID. 608(a)). Ironically, the district court stated that
polygraph evidence does not address the truthfulness of the subject's character. Accordingly, its
Rule 608(a) analysis should be unnecessary if not for a flawed opinion evidence requirement.
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standard had been overly restrictive. Expert testimony has long been
recognized as admissible to reinforce another witness's credibility;
20 3
using data to reconstruct an event offers another form of scientific
evidence. 20 4 Conversely, the Crumby court, which admitted polygraph
results, adopted a more permissive view of opinion testimony and held
that a polygraph examiner could offer his expert opinion under Rule
608(a). 20
5
The current case law is uncertain and even contradictory in its
application of Rule 608 to polygraph results. This development is
somewhat understandable because polygraph testimony is one area of
expert opinion evidence that closely parallels evidence of a subject's
truthful character under Rule 608(a). Likewise, polygraph results
closely skirt the Rule 608(b) prohibition against specific acts of a
truthful character. Accordingly, the true purpose of offering the
expert polygraph testimony should be the focus of the court's decision.
In the atypical event that a defendant presents a polygrapher's
testimony to show character for truthfulness, then the court must
analyze it within the parameters of Rule 608. Otherwise, the
polygraph evidence-both the results and the polygrapher's opinion-
should be admissible without any other prerequisites.
D. Rule 704(b): The Mens Rea Exclusion
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant
in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or
did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged
or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.
2 0 6
Rule 704(b) is arguably the most appropriate of the Federal
Rules of Evidence to apply in barring polygraph results because it
excludes all types of expert testimony on mens rea as a statutory per
se ban. Nonetheless, Rule 704(b) infrequently bars an expert
witness's polygraph testimony because polygraph evidence typically
addresses actus reus. Polygraph examinations essentially pose the
question: "Is the subject truthful in stating what his actions were?" At
least one court has articulated the divide between actus reus and mens
rea evidence through reference to the question's nature: mental state
versus factual questions.
20 7
203. See discussion supra Part I.A.
204. See supra note 17.
205. United States v. Crumby, 895 F.Supp. 1354, 1364 (D. Ariz. 1995).
206. FED. R. EVID. 704(b).
207. United States v. Ramirez-Robles, 386 F.3d 1234, 1245 (9th Cir. 2004).
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In two post-Daubert cases, the Ninth Circuit rejected polygraph
evidence used to disprove the subject's intent to commit a crime. 208 In
one of these cases, United States v. Campos, the appellate court
upheld the district court's decision not to hold a Daubert hearing
before excluding polygraph results.20 9 As another appellate court
noted, polygraph evidence is inherently at odds with Rule 704(b) for
proving intent because the expert witness must conclude whether the
subject-defendant possessed the requisite intent.210
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not differentiated actus
reus from mens rea polygraph evidence, Rule 704(b) is much like the
per se bars that the Court has upheld. Scheffer addressed the
constitutionality of a rule that barred an entire category of evidence. 211
The Court had already held that eliminating certain mens rea
defenses was constitutionally permissible. 21 2 Accordingly, Rule 704(b)
will likely remain the most appropriate of the general evidentiary
roadblocks to polygraph evidence in coming years.
E. Per Se Inadmissibility: State-Specific Laws and Actus Reus
Per se inadmissibility of polygraph evidence comes in two
forms: common law and statutory. Common law holdings can be
overturned by a jurisdiction's statutory rules of evidence. Accordingly,
Rules 702, 403, and 608 could compel the admission of polygraph
208. United States v. Booth, 309 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Campos, 217 F.3d
707 (9th Cir. 2000). But see United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 93, 98 (E.D. Mich. 1972)
(noting that intent requirements for a perjury offense were a good use of polygraph evidence (a
pre-Daubert decision)).
209. Campos, 217 F.3d at 710.
210. United States v. Finley, 301 F.3d 1000, 1014-16 (9th Cir. 2002).
211. Scheffer IV, 523 U.S. 303, 305 (1998). The Scheffer decision is also interesting here
because the Court upheld the evidentiary rule as applied to mens rea evidence. Id. at 306, 317.
The Scheffer defendant sought admission of polygraph evidence to prove that he used narcotics
without knowledge. He claimed that he awoke one morning in his car without any knowledge of
ingesting drugs. Scheffer II, 44 M.J. at 443-44. His brief arguing against certiorari used his
polygraph results as proof that he lacked the requisite intent. Brief In Opposition to Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari at 2, United States v. Scheffer, 520 U.S. 1227 (1997) (No. 96-1133), available
at 1997 WL 33484621 [hereafter Scheffer III] ('The only evidence admitted against respondent at
his court-martial to prove his wrongful and knowing use of methamphetamine was the result of
a random urinalysis test.") (emphasis added). See United States v. Pabon, 42 M.J. 404, 406
(C.A.A.F. 1995) (imposing a "knowingly" mens rea requirement on the statute). Thus, the
defendant essentially contested mens rea. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 203 (1991)
(court could not instruct jury not to consider evidence of defendant's belief that he had no duty to
file a tax return because he did not believe that wages were taxable income). Furthermore, the
proffered testimony of the polygraph examiner would certainly appear to be conclusive as to the
intent element. See Finley, 301 F.3d at 1014-16 (noting the inherent problem of such testimony
under Rule 704(b)).
212. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 51 (1996).
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evidence despite any common law rules against polygraph
admissibility, provided that the test methodology and evidentiary
purpose fit within those rules.
When properly applied, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not
provide a universal, absolute bar to polygraph admissibility.
Therefore, jurisdictions that want polygraph evidence to be
inadmissible at all times can only turn to statutory bars. Such per se
exclusionary rules, like the Military Rule 707 highlighted in Scheffer,
can only be overcome by constitutional protections. 213 Furthermore,
the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to identify a situation where
preventing the defendant from presenting polygraph testimony would
violate his or her constitutional rights. In Scheffer, the Justices split
on whether a defendant could ever trigger a constitutional right to
admit polygraph evidence; they only agreed that Scheffer's situation
had not triggered one. 214 Therefore, implicating constitutional rights
poses a high threshold to overcome evidentiary rules that bar
polygraph evidence.
IV. HINGING ADMISSIBILITY ON CASE-SPECIFIC RELEVANCE
One solution to the repeated misapplications of the Federal
Rules of Evidence cited in Part III is to limit the general evidentiary
rules to their standard, case-specific applications and, if desired by the
jurisdiction, to enact per se bans by statute. Each evidentiary rule
could still bar polygraph evidence but only after a case-specific
determination. Reliability concerns, as embodied in Rule 702, will
always be the most critical bar to any scientific evidence. As time
passes, however, researchers might refine a particular polygraph
technique, leading to greater acceptance of it as reliable. In those
instances, only a statutory rule will be able to bar the evidence.
Rule 702 should be the primary bar to polygraph evidence
because polygraph evidence is ultimately scientific evidence. As
always, courts must examine the specific technique and its particular
application, 215 and courts should not interpret Scheffer to bar all
polygraph evidence. The Scheffer opinion outlined legitimate policy
reasons to exclude polygraph evidence but did so in upholding a
promulgated rule rather than common law.
216
The other evidentiary rules can be used to bar polygraph
evidence, but few circumstances require their application. Rule 403
213. See supra notes 97-109 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 140-156.
216. See supra notes 100-105 and accompanying text.
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can bar polygraph evidence but only in relation to its proffered
purpose. If, for instance, the evidence comes close to violating Rule
608(b), then Rule 403 provides appropriate grounds for barring the
evidence. Furthermore, Rule 403 could be beneficial when the
polygraph evidence would have an unfairly duplicative effect because
of the availability of other witnesses who can reinforce the subject's
credibility. 217 Similarly, Rule 608 can bar polygraph evidence in the
infrequent event that its proponent offers it to show the subject's
general character for truthfulness. 218 Meanwhile, Rule 704(b) can
continue barring polygraph evidence in the instances where it
pertains to mens rea because excluding a specific defense is
constitutional.219
Although statutory per se bans offer the most enduring means
to bar polygraph evidence, such statutes remain subject to
constitutional limitations. The constitutional analysis to overcome a
statutory bar far exceeds the scope of this Note, and numerous articles
already address when a law so limits the defense's case as to violate
the defendant's constitutional rights.220  More importantly, the
Federal Rules of Evidence do not include such a provision, so any
analysis here would rely on predicting hypothetical statutory
language.
V. SPECIFIc RULES TO CONTROL WHERE GENERAL ONES CANNOT
Opponents of polygraph evidence should safeguard their
jurisdictions by imposing statutory per se bans rather than permitting
courts to warp general evidentiary rules to the same end. Scientific
re-creations, documents, and even eyewitness recollections carry risks
of presenting inaccurate information to the fact-finder. Polygraph
evidence is no different. However, under current evidentiary rules,
juries can have the opportunity to consider such evidence.
Furthermore, legislatures that fail to enact bans risk the possibility
that new scientific research will strengthen arguments in favor of
admitting polygraph evidence under Daubert. As a result of such
scientific findings, Rule 702 would be less likely to act as a bar to the
admission of polygraph evidence.
Although per se bans may still succumb to constitutional
protections, the U.S. Supreme Court has set a high threshold to strike
down such rules. For now, legislatures opposed to polygraph evidence
217. See supra text accompanying notes 184-185.
218. See discussion supra Part III.C.
219. See discussion supra Part III.D.
220. See supra note 53 (providing a short list of articles).
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must decide whether to acquiesce to the uncertain-and ultimately,
limited-protections of generic evidentiary rules or enact more
concrete statutory bars. Regardless of the ultimate choice, courts
must cease overextending evidentiary rules drafted for case-specific
applications to serve as per se bars to polygraph evidence.
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